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Abstract 
Contrary to dominant approaches that locate the causes for military entrepreneurialism 
in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo predominantly in criminal military elites, 
this article highlights the importance of the Congolese military’s (FARDC) civilian 
context for understanding military revenue-generation. It analyses how the latter is 
shaped by structures of domination, signification and legitimisation that drive and are 
driven by the FARDC’s governance, private protection and security practices. It argues 
that these practices contribute to bestowing a degree of legitimacy on both the FARDC’s 
position of power and some of its revenue-generation activities. Furthermore, by 
emphasising that the FARDC’s regulatory and protection practices are partly the product 
of popular demands and the routine actions of civilians, the article contends that the 
causes of military revenue-generation are co-located in the military’s civilian 
environment. In this manner, it offers a more nuanced conceptualisation of military 
entrepreneurialism, thus opening up new perspectives on policy interventions in this 
area. 
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[Les affaires militaires et les affaires des militaires dans le Kivu]. Contrairement aux 
approches dominantes qui trouvent les causes de l’entrepreneuriat des militaires dans 
l’est de la RDC essentiellement dans les élites militaires criminelles, cet article met en 
exergue l’importance du contexte civil de l’armée congolaise (FARDC) pour 
comprendre les pratiques militaires génératrices de revenus. Il analyse comment ces 
dernières sont influencées par les structures de domination, de signification et de 
légitimation qui conduisent et sont conduites par les pratiques de gouvernance, de 
protection privée et de sécurité des FARDC. L’article soutient que ces pratiques 
contribuent à l’attribution d’un degré de légitimité tant sur la position du pouvoir des 
FARDC que sur certaines de leurs activités de génération de revenus. En outre, en 
insistant sur le fait que les pratiques de protection et de régulation des FARDC résultent 
en partie des demandes populaires et des actions de routine des civils, l’article soutient 
que les origines des activités de génération de revenus des militaires sont co localisés 
dans l’environnement civil des militaires. De cette manière, l’article offre une 
conceptualisation de l’entreprenariat militaire plus nuancé, ouvrant ainsi de nouvelles 
perspectives pour les interventions des bailleurs de fonds dans ce domaine. 
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Introduction: differing perspectives on military entrepreneurialism 
in the DR Congo 
‘Faced with a gun, what can you do?’ reads the title of a report on the 
militarisation of mining in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(hereafter DRC) from a well- known conflict minerals advocacy 
organisation (Global Witness 2009). In the popular imagination, the 
involvement of the Congolese military (Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo – FARDC) in revenue-generating activities in 
the DRC’s eastern Kivu provinces is associated with violent extortion and 
forced labour at gunpoint. However, over a year of ethnographic field 
research in the Kivus between 2010 and 20121 revealed that this image 
presents only one dimension of a wide repertoire of military economic 
practices. It appears therefore to be more the product of analysis informed 
by norms than empirically grounded knowledge. 
From the perspective of world military history, the notion that 
armed forces should be financed entirely through public funds has 
become established only recently. This norm, which is anchored in 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-
inspired conceptualisations of the state, is at present respected in only a 
small number of mostly Western countries (Brömmelhörster and Paes 
2003). Nevertheless, it deeply informs thinking on the security sector in 
countries that are the object of statebuilding efforts. This certainly applies 
to the DRC, where military entrepreneurialism has been framed in the 
discourse of the criminalisation and privatisation of the state (Bayart et al. 
1999). 
These framings have influenced mainstream explanations for this 
phenomenon, which can roughly be divided into three strands. The first 
ascribes the FARDC’s involvement in revenue-generation to greed (e.g. 
Bafilemba 2010), echoing neoclassical economic theories of violent 
conflict that are based on rational choice thinking (e.g. Collier 2000). 
These approaches draw inspiration from widespread international 
attention to the business activities of ‘generals-turned-businessmen’ such 
as former FARDC Chief of Staff Gabriel Amisi (e.g. Fessy 2010), or 
analyses of criminal networks in the FARDC (e.g. United Nations [UN] 
Group of Experts 2010). A second strand emphasises the FARDC’s 
organizational culture and values. These are seen to be reflected in 
‘impunity’, and believed to be the product of the ‘historical legacy’ of 
their predecessor forces, in particular the brutal colonial Force Publique 
and the rapacious military of Mobutu (e.g. Davis 2009, Robinson 2012). 
A third line of explanations highlights the non- or underpayment of 
FARDC soldiers (e.g. Ebenga and N’landu 2005, Rackley 2006), 
reflecting theories of petty corruption and power abuse in state 
bureaucracies that emphasise the wage incentives of civil servants (e.g. 
Besley and McLaren 1993). 
These explanations ascribe behaviour to incentives, interests and 
values either at the level of individual soldiers or that of the military 
institution. Thus, they fail to take into consideration the crucial 
interaction between the military and the social context in which the armed 
forces are embedded. Secondly, they tend to emphasise either socio-
economic conditions or norms, values and mentalities, often 
conceptualised as static phenomena. Such an approach ignores the 
dynamic interplay between and indivisibility of what Giddens (1984, pp. 
28–33) has coined structures of domination, signification and 
legitimisation. Thirdly, they often uncritically project the 
victim/victimiser dichotomy onto economic relations between the military 
and civilians, while paying little attention to how military revenue-
generating activities are co-produced and instrumentalised by 
populations. This tendency follows from ‘predatory governance’ thinking, 
which highlights the parasitic nature of the Congolese state. Such analysis 
neglects the fact that the Congolese administration does, in fact, deliver 
some necessary public and private services, and may have some – albeit 
tenuous – legitimacy (Eriksson Baaz and Olsson 2011, Trefon 2009). 
Contrary to analyses of military entrepreneurialism focusing 
solely on the military, this article’s point of departure is the FARDC’s 
position within the social order of the Kivus. This should not be taken to 
mean that the internal workings of the military are of no relevance. On the 
contrary, they are an important underlying cause of military revenue 
generation. However, it is argued that internal military dynamics provide 
only a partial explanation for a complex phenomenon that is the product 
of multiple interacting factors. The approach followed herein draws 
attention to how military revenue generation is shaped by militarised 
structures that are in part (re)produced by the routine practices of 
civilians. It is not intended to suggest thereby that civilians have no 
agency, for they certainly contest military power, at times in effective 
ways. In fact, the set of mostly informal norms that guide the FARDC’s 
revenue-generating practices is the outcome of processes of negotiation, 
not only within the military, but also between the military and civilian 
actors (cf. Garrett et al. 2009). As these negotiation processes are strongly 
shaped by power relations and prevailing discourses and norms, their 
outcomes often, but not always, contribute to the (re)production of the 
dominant position of elites. However, in accordance with Giddens’s 
(1984) notion of structuration, it is argued that these processes are 
ultimately contingent, hence their outcomes also reflect actors’ agency.  
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. In the first 
part, a brief overview is given of the historical processes leading to the 
present state of militarisation of the Kivus’ social order. The second part 
describes a number of the core features of military policies and the 
FARDC’s organisation that contribute to the militarisation of the Kivus. 
The third part, in which civilians’ routine practices and perceptions 
occupy centre stage, will analyse how the military functions as a public 
and private regulator. This is followed by a discussion of the military’s 
involvement in private protection arrangements with civilians, and how 
these relate to civilian–military collaboration in the economic sphere. The 
article then explains how the FARDC’s regulatory, protection and 
security practices, amongst other factors, affect perceptions of the relative 
legitimacy of its power position and revenue-generating activities. 
Finally, in the concluding section, the article reflects upon the 
implications of its findings for policy initiatives designed to influence the 
military’s revenue-generation practices. 
 
The militarisation of the social order in the Kivus 
The explosion of violence that occurred in the course of the two Congo 
wars (1996–1997 and 1998 2003) triggered a radical ‘militarisation’ of 
the Kivus. The notion of militarization is defined herein as the process of 
the increasing imprint of armed actors and violent modes of regulation, 
action and thinking on various arenas of society (Bernazzoli and Flint 
2009). Militarisation affects political and economic structures on the one 
hand, and social norms, modes of thinking and identities on the other. 
This last component can also be described as the spread of ‘militarism’ 
defined as a discourse (Luckham 1994, p. 24). In the context of the Kivus, 
militarism is understood to describe the discourses that render violence an 
accepted mode of human conduct, and that legitimise violent actors’ 
exercise of power. As argued by Jabri (1996), violence as a social practice 
can become institutionalised, indicating the dominant position of (those 
supporting) violent actors and of discourses legitimising violence. This 
does not however imply that militarisation is only an elite project. In line 
with the theory of structuration, it is posited that it is in the routines of 
everyday life, the day-to-day social activities and encounters of both the 
military and civilians, that militarised structures are (re)produced. 
Therefore, militarisation should not be seen as the one-sided imposition 
of violent actors on society. Rather, it is a process of institutionalisation 
that is ‘both a medium and outcome’ of the actions of all agents within a 
social system (Giddens 1984, p. 25). 
The Congo wars triggered the rise of a new class of violent actors. 
These built upon existing social networks, which were consequently 
transformed and militarised (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004). In 
order to establish control, these violent actors needed a modicum of 
collaboration from civilians. As outlined by Kalyvas (2006, p. 101), 
civilian collaboration with armed actors in situations of violent conflict is 
the outcome of ‘a dynamic, shifting, fluid and often inconsistent 
confluence of multiple and varying preferences and constraints’. One of 
the most powerful factors within this confluence is undoubtedly coercion, 
as its impact is not only direct, but also heavily shapes strategies of future 
action. However, other factors promoting collaboration with armed actors 
are more related to preferences and opportunities. These include 
possibilities for income-generation, the obtaining or maintaining of 
positions of status and authority, and access to public goods and private 
services. Despite this wide range of motives, the majority of people are 
strongly driven by ‘survival maximising behaviour’ and display weak 
preferences (ibid., p. 103). This could clearly be observed in the DRC, 
where many civilians opted to collaborate with armed actors for purposes 
of self-preservation or in order to obtain certain benefits. Consequently, 
interacting and cooperating with armed actors became a part of everyday 
life and was turned into a ‘routine practice’ (Giddens 1984, p. 60). As the 
rules and resources that agents draw upon in enacting routine practices 
are ‘at the same time the means of systems reproduction’ (ibid, p. 19), 
this routinisation became a crucial element in the (re)production of the 
militarised order. Civilians’ increased collaboration with armed actors 
was enabled by and led to shifting definitions of licit wealth (cf. Roitman 
1998) and transformed representations of economic organization (Jackson 
2002). These processes were already under way in the second half of the 
1970s, when the contraction of the official economy and the 
institutionalisation of ‘la débrouillardise’ or ‘fending-for-one-self-ism’, 
ensured that trickery, cunning, coercion and deceit became acceptable 
modes of wealth creation (Trefon 2002, Nzeza Bilakila 2004). The major 
transformation of the Kivus’ economy during the Congo wars, and the 
ensuing decline in livelihood opportunities, further legitimised 
unscrupulous and coercive income-generation. Rampant insecurity 
reinforced the isolation of far-flung rural areas and made markets 
inaccessible, leading many communities to retreat into subsistence 
farming. Others were pushed towards the exploitation and trade of natural 
resources, a sector that was almost entirely controlled by militarised 
networks. At the same time, youngsters enrolled in militias or turned to 
violent crime as a livelihood strategy (Vlassenroot 2004). Within this 
economy of despair and opportunism, violent modes of appropriation and 
economic collaboration with armed actors became institutionalized 
practices. 
Parallel developments can be detected in the domain of politics. 
Well before the wars, violent strategies of identity politics were becoming 
an increasingly widespread mode of obtaining and projecting political 
power (Jewsiewicki 1998). The process of attempted democratisation in 
the early 1990s unleashed a vigorous power competition that occasionally 
took on violent forms. This was most powerfully demonstrated by the 
outbreak of inter-communal violence in first Katanga and later North 
Kivu (Mamdani 1998). Militarisation in the war era built upon, 
accelerated and intensified these existing processes of institutional and 
discursive change. In the Kivus, armed groups established their own 
forms of rule and acquired control over a large part of the administrative 
apparatus, exercising fiscal, justice, policing, and other governance 
functions. As a consequence, the nature of politics and authority was 
profoundly reshaped. While the position of elders was undermined by 
younger generations of armed actors, the majority of local authorities and 
politicians saw few alternatives to collaborating with armed actors in 
order to obtain or maintain influence. These processes were both 
facilitated by and led to shifts in representations of legitimate authority 
(Vlassenroot 2004, Jourdan 2004). 
Through the power-sharing peace agreement concluded in 2002, 
parts of the militarized political–economic networks that had risen to 
prominence in the course of the wars were integrated into the state 
apparatus, including within the armed forces. This enabled some factions 
to translate wartime gains into post-settlement influence, which helped 
legitimize their power position. At the same time, the ways in which 
power-sharing unfolded skewed incentive structures towards the 
continued use of violence (Tull and Mehler 2005). A policy of ‘many 
carrots and few sticks’ towards dissident rebel factions and political 
entrepreneurs who resorted to coercion helped ensure that violence 
continued to be rewarded, specifically in the Kivus (Eriksson Baaz and 
Verweijen 2013). As a consequence, violence and collaboration with 
violent actors remained institutionalised practices. Therefore, the 
structures of militarisation that had formed during the wars were not 
significantly transformed. What did change in many places, however, was 
the identity of the dominant violent actors, as several former rebel-held 
areas now came under control of the government forces. 	
Military characteristics and policies contributing to militarisation 
In 2003, as a central element of the peace agreement, all ex-belligerents’ 
fighting forces were theoretically placed under the unified command of 
the newly created FARDC. Furthermore, a process was initiated to 
gradually merge all troops into new units, while breaking down war-era 
command structures. However, this so called ‘brassage’ (literally, 
brewing) process failed to produce a coherent military under a single 
command chain. As many of the armed factions strove to retain control 
over established economic networks, spheres of influence and 
constituencies, they either sabotaged or manipulated the integration 
process in their own interests. While parts of certain groups refused 
outright to integrate, others were reluctant to redeploy their troops out of 
the Kivus (Wolters and Boshoff 2006). Over the years, several of the 
brassage dodgers reconstituted themselves as armed groups, and their 
numbers were boosted by FARDC deserters dissatisfied with their ranks 
and positions. Some of these armed groups however subsequently 
reintegrated, as the process of military integration was never declared to 
have been completed. 
The ongoing (re)integration of armed groups has had four 
important effects on the FARDC. First, as shall be explained further 
below, it has reinforced the army’s involvement in revenue-generation. 
Second, it has contributed to the proliferation of parallel power structures 
and command chains, as integrated groups continue to function as 
separate networks within the army (Eriksson Baaz 2011). Third, rebel-
military integration has in practice reinforced centrifugal tendencies, 
given that many integrated factions still maintain close contacts with 
political–commercial and armed actors outside the military. This is in part 
the result of the lack of redeployment of integrated troops out of the 
Kivus (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 2013). Sources in the UN estimate 
that in 2011, over two-thirds of the military deployed in these provinces 
were native. As locally recruited troops often retain strong links to local 
social networks, this strengthens the FARDC’s involvement in political, 
economic and social regulation. Such involvement is further facilitated by 
the fact that the majority of FARDC troops do not reside in military 
barracks, but instead live among the civilian population (Verweijen 
2015). A final effect of rebel-military integration as it has been 
implemented in the Kivus is that some army units are not properly 
balanced, with a majority of troops composed of members of a particular 
rebel faction. This phenomenon surfaced after the rapid integration in 
2009 of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès 
National pour la Défense du Peuple – CNDP) and some smaller armed 
groups. The deployment of such unbalanced units may aggravate 
intercommunity tensions and place strains on civilian–military relations, 
specifically where conflicts are framed as identity-based (International 
Crisis Group 2010). Given these complex power dynamics and variations 
in composition, the FARDC is heterogeneous in its make-up, and 
substantial differences can be observed between one unit and the next 
(Verweijen 2015). Therefore, the observations on the FARDC made in 
this article should be taken as general patterns rather than applying to the 
army en bloc. Despite this, what all parts of the military do have in 
common is that they are strongly shaped by the logics of ‘Big Man 
networks’ (Utas 2012). These networks operate throughout the Congolese 
military, intersecting, overlapping and conflicting with the formal 
hierarchy (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013). As their functioning is based 
upon the convertibility of economic resources into political ones and vice 
versa, the Big Man logics that shape these networks generate a drive for 
the accumulation of wealth and control over income-generating 
opportunities. This leads to the use of access to office as a political 
resource, creating pervasive insecurity of tenure (Bayart 2006). Two 
important ways in which this insecurity is created within the FARDC are 
first, the frequent restructuring of the military organisation, and second, 
the regular redeployment of particular units (Verweijen 2015). Both these 
processes create an ongoing risk that military personnel will find 
themselves in less lucrative positions and zones. As a consequence, 
commanders frantically try to reap the benefits of their position as long as 
it lasts. The fluctuations in deployments and power distribution that result 
from these dynamics are not only an internal military affair, for they 
strongly shape and are shaped by external political developments. As the 
Big Man networks that military elites are part of exceed the boundaries of 
the FARDC, political, military and economic power in the Kivus are 
closely intertwined.  
As elsewhere, the power of the political–commercial elites who 
control the Congolese state apparatus is ultimately founded upon their 
capacity to mobilise coercion. The military, as well as other (in)security 
services, have always been a key instrument for the exercise of that 
coercion (e.g. Schatzberg 1988). Furthermore, as will be described later in 
more detail, political–commercial elites depend upon armed actors for 
revenue-generation and vice versa. Therefore, there are mutual 
dependencies between FARDC officers and political– commercial elites. 
This pattern is reproduced at every level of governance, from the local to 
the provincial to the national. In the present-day Kivus, it leads to 
considerable instability as it creates close interactions between ongoing 
political, economic and military power struggles. The resulting volatility 
weakens Kinshasa’s grip over the Kivus, an area it has historically ruled 
more via intermediaries than through direct administrative intervention 
(Tull 2005).  
While they are partly dependent upon civilian authorities, there is 
a constant threat that military elites may become more autonomous of 
their civilian counterparts or switch sides to different power networks. As 
a result, incumbent politicians do little to rein in top officers’ business 
activities, hoping to buy off their loyalty in this way (Howe 2001). For 
the government, this approach also reflects its need for loyal 
intermediaries who can exercise influence over the Kivus. A similar logic 
applies to the armed groups that have been co-opted into the incumbents’ 
power network by means of their integration into the FARDC. Most of 
the time, this co-optation involves the provision of material rewards. The 
cheapest solution for the cash-strapped government is to make these pay-
offs self-financing, by granting integrated armed groups access to 
revenue-generating opportunities. As a consequence, these groups’ 
continued integration in the military has in some cases become dependent 
on their ongoing access to such pay-offs (Eriksson Baaz 2011). This 
makes it difficult to curtail, let alone end, such revenue-generating 
activities, especially since integrated groups are in a position to 
reconstitute themselves relatively easily as militarized networks outside 
the bounds of the state. In this manner, the interdependencies between 
military and civilian elites further foster military revenue-generating 
practices, while entrenching the militarisation of the Kivus’ social order. 
 
The FARDC as a public and private regulatory authority 
Given the porous boundaries between military, political and economic 
power, as well as the close connections between military and civilian 
actors, the military’s economic practices cannot be properly understood in 
isolation from the FARDC’s position within the Kivus’ social order. Of 
particular importance in this respect is the FARDC’s role in social, 
economic and political regulation of both a private and a public nature. 
As will be demonstrated below, ‘public’ and ‘private’ regulation are best 
conceptualised not as binary opposites but as two ends of a spectrum, 
with many hybrid forms in between. Therefore, some of the underlying 
mechanisms are the same. One of these is the weakness of local civilian 
authorities, which can be identified as both a cause and a consequence of 
the militarisation of regulatory authority. 
Civilian authorities’ legitimacy and capacities, already heavily 
eroded before the Congo wars (Van Acker 2005), have not been 
significantly reinforced in the post-settlement era. In most of the zones 
where the FARDC has taken over control from non-state armed groups, 
administrative infrastructure and civilian mechanisms of governance have 
remained weak (Vlassenroot and Romkema 2007). In outlying rural zones 
in particular, where the FARDC easily outnumbers the understaffed state 
administration, civilian authorities continue to have relatively little 
influence. Local administrators and customary chiefs excel in 
‘tracasseries’ (harassment) and are often seen as partisan, corrupt or 
ineffective. Furthermore, police forces are scarce and underequipped, and 
their services are expensive, as people have to pay ‘makolo ya leta’ or 
‘transportation costs’ for every case. Finally, customary and other local 
tribunals lack both accessibility and legitimacy, and many of their 
verdicts are never implemented, as unfavourable judgements are simply 
ignored (Scheye 2011). As a consequence, justice and dispute resolution 
are exceedingly complicated and problematic processes, involving 
negotiations with many different parties and often fuelling existing or 
creating new conflicts. The limited legitimacy and capacities of both state 
and non-state civilian governance actors have increased the propensity of 
civilians to turn to violent actors, often the FARDC, for forms of 
regulation. This is a two-way process, as the weakness of civilian 
authorities allows armed actors to impose themselves with varying 
degrees of force. In all sites where field research was conducted, it was 
observed that the FARDC was involved in conflict resolution and 
arbitration, policing, economic regulation and other governance practices. 
Since the legal boundaries between the official mandates of different 
authorities are little known, and often considered to be of little relevance 
to large segments of the population, civilians engage in ‘forum shopping’ 
(von Benda-Beckmann 1981). That is, they solicit intervention from the 
authorities they consider to be most powerful, accessible, legitimate, 
understandable and effective (Baker and Scheye 2007). A police officer 
in Lubero territory explained that he could not compete with the military 
in terms of dispute settlement, as the FARDC offer cheaper, faster and 
more effective solutions: ‘The law takes time and is uncertain. Violence 
is fast and easy. You pay the FARDC and you get what you want. And 
many people want to punish their wrong-doers.’ At the same time, 
soldiers themselves are ‘shopping forums’ (von Benda-Beckmann 1981), 
as they usurp jurisdiction over and manipulate disputes from which they 
expect to gain political advantage and income. While ‘shopping’, the 
FARDC is often in fierce competition with other state services, for whom 
‘fees’, ‘motivations’ and ‘fines’ (paid, for example, for being released 
from arbitrary detention) constitute a considerable source of income. 
Referring to the plethora of solicited and unsolicited tasks he 
fulfils within his area of responsibility, an FARDC sector commander 
described his social function as that of ‘Mwami sans frontières’ or 
‘customary-chief-without-borders’. As examples of the diverse duties he 
carries out, this commander mentioned intervening in a conflict about the 
succession of a local chief; guaranteeing the security of local football 
matches and the weekly markets; arresting cow herders accused of having 
poisoned cattle; throwing the losing party in a heritage dispute off family-
owned land; and demanding that the son of a notable pay his dowry. As 
the boundaries between the public and the private are blurred in the DRC, 
as is characteristic of hybrid orders (Erdmann and Engel 2006), the cases 
for which FARDC intervention may be solicited include the violent 
settling of scores (e.g. revenge and rivalries) and accounts (e.g. debts and 
land disputes) arising from envy and personal or family disputes. 
Examples are conflicts over heritage, marriage, debts, real estate, love 
affairs, land, power positions and past wrongdoing. Either upon request of 
the ‘client’, or in order to effectively fulfil the task and benefit most from 
it, such private dispute resolution may entail FARDC intimidation, the 
harming of its clients’ opponents, or the use of force to appropriate goods 
or plots. In such situations, the FARDC turns into ‘private guns’ and 
‘enforcers-for-hire’, as Schatzberg (1988, p. 60) called these functions in 
relation to the Zairian military. 
This confirms Kalyvas’s (2006, p. 14) observations that civilians 
‘use political actors to settle their own private conflicts’, highlighting the 
joint production of violence in situations of civil war. The resulting 
‘privatisation of politics’ makes it difficult to identify the discursively 
constructed and continually shifting boundaries between private and 
public. Furthermore, the involvement of armed actors in private 
regulation often produces public effects, particularly when private 
disputes concern members of antagonistically defined groups. In such 
situations, perceived ‘unjust’ adjudications and interventions may trigger 
communal tensions. For example, in Fizi territory, it was observed how 
the intervention of an FARDC officer in a private conflict over debt 
between two individuals from groups with longstanding hostile relations 
(a Mubembe and a Munyamulenge), created tensions in all of the 
surrounding villages. The Mubembe individual felt disadvantaged by the 
FARDC’s attempt to collect the debt from him, particularly since the 
officer involved was a Rwandophone seen as favouring the 
Banyamulenge, another Rwandophone group. He therefore threatened to 
mobilise a local Mai Mai group in order to take revenge. This example 
illustrates how the regulation of interpersonal conflicts can have spin-off 
effects in the public sphere. Inversely, violent conflict can create private 
grudges and feuds, particularly as former combatants responsible for past 
abuses go unpunished, whilst residing in local communities. Therefore, 
the boundaries between public and private regulation are not always easy 
to draw, specifically when also taking the indirect and longer-term effects 
of actions into consideration. 
 
Private protection arrangements in a context of institutionalised 
insecurity 
In many cases, the forms of regulation provided by the FARDC are part 
of private protection arrangements that are sometimes embedded in the 
Big Man relationships that are a crucial part of the functioning of the 
Kivus’ social order. Individuals at every level of society seek patronage 
from influential persons in exchange for loyalty, support and various 
favours. A major driver of this process is the high level of everyday 
insecurity faced by Congolese citizens (cf. Erdmann and Engel 2006). 
Two important causes of this insecurity are the unpredictability of 
prebendalistic state services and the existence of multiple regulatory and 
normative frameworks (Trefon 2002). In the specific context of the 
Kivus, it is also produced by the presence of a wide range of armed 
factions and widespread banditry. The resulting pervasive insecurity 
drives people to seek private protection from Big Men who also dispose 
of the means of coercion. Such protection may be provided either on a 
transactional basis, involving direct remuneration or other compensation, 
or be part of longer-term relations that include more comprehensive 
forms of services and favours, such as brokerage and influence-
trafficking. Some examples of private protection services provided to 
civilians by the FARDC are physical protection (e.g. guarding houses and 
private property), property rights enforcement (e.g. collecting debts), 
influence-peddling (e.g. arranging tax exemptions, exploitation licences, 
tenders), and shielding or facilitating illicit activities (e.g. protecting 
brothels against closure, smuggling). Sometimes, private protection is 
primarily imposed by the FARDC and assumes forms resembling 
extortion. However, in other cases, civilians actively solicit FARDC 
protection, as its services are seen as particularly effective in a number of 
respects. First, military networks can offer physical protection, a highly 
coveted good in a context of rampant insecurity. Second, both through 
coercion and its contacts with the political–commercial elite, the FARDC 
has a significant influence on political and administrative decision-
making. This allows them to shield protégés against administrative 
harassment or control from other state services. Finally, through their 
access to the means of coercion, the FARDC can offer violent and 
therefore relatively effective enforcement, appropriation and account-
settling services. 
Private protection in the framework of clientelistic relations is of 
specific importance for economic operators. Most of the economic 
transactions in the Kivus are not fully regulated by formal institutions, 
and the extent to which they are is commonly a matter of negotiation 
(Rubbers 2007). Due to this relative absence of (the application of) 
formal rules, alternative mechanisms of property rights enforcement 
apply. The smooth functioning of these mechanisms depends either on 
trust or, where trust is scarce, on private protection provided by coercive 
actors (Gambetta 1993). As trust among entrepreneurs in the DRC has 
plummeted from the Mobutu era onwards (Rubbers 2009), economic 
operators in the Kivus have increasingly solicited protection from violent 
actors (Raeymaekers 2007), including for the enforcement of agreements, 
dispute settlement and debt collection. 
Military protection services are provided on such a large scale that 
they have infused the workings of the Kivus’ entire social order. This has 
created a self-reinforcing spiral, as those who do not enjoy military 
protection feel they are at a comparative disadvantage (Gambetta 1993). 
For example, through their presence at border-crossings and their 
influence on customs and other authorities, the FARDC can import and 
export goods at heavily reduced tariffs (Tegera and Johnson 2007). Many 
cross-border traders make use of their connections with senior army 
officers in order to obtain these reductions, leaving their competitors with 
comparatively lower profit margins. The same logic of comparative 
(dis)advantage applies to the domain of transport. Those operators who 
arrange to transport their goods in vehicles owned or protected by the 
military, have a lower risk of incurring losses through ambushes and 
robberies. This incentivises other businessmen and women to solicit 
similar protection. Even at lower levels, this competitive mechanism of 
protection is at work. In the town of Misisi, a gold mining site in Fizi 
territory, there is a chaos of ‘étalages’ (displays for merchandise) in the 
residential quarters. However, officially, goods can only be sold at the 
market or along the main road. Whereas most of these illegal étalages are 
owned by wives of soldiers, other civilian women with connections with 
the FARDC also engage in this practice. It not only allows them to avoid 
paying the taxe d’étalage at the market, but also gives them a better place 
for selling goods, as they can directly target passers-by. 
In many cases, military protection takes place in the framework of 
more comprehensive economic collaboration between the military and 
civilians. Some of the features that make the FARDC attractive as a 
provider of protection also make it an attractive business partner. 
Additionally, the FARDC possesses specific qualities as an economic 
actor. As well as being a combat organisation, the FARDC is an 
economic network with wide geographical coverage. It possesses a labour 
force, infrastructure such as communications and transport systems, and 
has access to large information flows. Furthermore, it is either legally or 
de facto exempt from taxation, and possesses symbolic capital due to its 
status as a state actor (cf. Brömmelhörster and Paes 2003). Finally, senior 
officers have access to investment capital and cash, both of which are 
highly coveted in an environment where banking infrastructure is almost 
completely lacking and access to credit exceedingly restricted. These 
characteristics make it attractive for civilians to do business with the 
FARDC. Due to the resultant widespread collaboration, civilians and the 
military have become highly economically interdependent. Given that 
power in the Kivus is to a large extent obtained, maintained and projected 
through the accumulation and redistribution of (access to) resources, this 
has strengthened the FARDC’s power position. 
The above section has demonstrated that the FARDC’s economic 
activities are enabled by and embedded in their public and private 
regulatory and protection practices. These practices are shaped by a 
complex mix of preferences and constraints, demands and offers, 
persuasion and coercion, both among the military and civilians. They are 
not only the result of the FARDC’s power position, but also help 
construct it. One way in which they do so, as will be explained in the 
following section, is by bestowing a certain degree of legitimacy on the 
FARDC’s power. 
 
The relative legitimacy of the FARDC’s power position in the Kivus  
The field research revealed that perceptions of the FARDC’s legitimacy 
vary considerably across time and space. Such perceptions are 
intersubjectively constructed by a set of mutually reinforcing factors. 
Logically, views on the legitimacy of the military’s power strongly 
influence and are influenced by evaluations of the FARDC’s economic 
practices, specifically when these are framed in the discourse of public 
security. According to Beetham (1991), the legitimacy of power is 
determined by three elements: first, its conformity to established formal 
and informal rules; second, the justifiability of these rules in terms of 
beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinated groups; and third, the 
demonstrable expression of consent on the part of subordinates, 
specifically through public actions. In the following section, each of these 
three dimensions will be explored.  
Unsurprisingly, it is fairly easy to encounter civilians in the Kivus 
who are highly dissatisfied with the FARDC’s power position and 
economic practices. In many cases, their comments reflect an awareness 
that the FARDC’s prerogatives and practices transgress official rules and 
regulations. Civilian authorities complain about constant unauthorised 
interference with their work. One locality chief in Fizi territory stated: 
‘When they were deployed here, we, the customary chiefs had no work. 
We simply couldn’t do our work.’ Economic operators widely denounce 
the FARDC’s irregular involvement in business activities. For example, a 
member of the Federation of Congolese Enterprises in Uvira stated: 
‘They never pay taxes, they are above the law.’ While farmers throughout 
the Kivus question the right of the FARDC to levy taxes at the market, 
fishermen likewise declare the Navy’s appropriation of a fixed share of 
their catch illegal. Yet, despite this widely circulating discursively 
articulated awareness of law-breaking, the picture of the FARDC’s 
legitimacy becomes much more complex when its authority is placed in 
comparative perspective, and analysed in relation to the informal norms 
that are enacted in civilians’ everyday practices. Given that vast swathes 
of the Kivus are under control of armed groups, the FARDC’s authority 
may seem comparatively more legitimate than that of non-state armed 
actors, although patterns are mixed. The FARDC is strongly associated 
with the state and the government. It is popularly called ‘jeshi ya serikali’ 
(‘army of the government’) or simply ‘serikali’ (‘government’), in part to 
distinguish them from non-state armed forces, generally called ‘jeshi’. 
This gives it an undoubted edge of legitimacy over these latter forces. 
Although people in some field research sites declared a preference to the 
presence of non-state armed forces, in the majority of zones it was the 
opposite (see also Oxfam International 2012). When inquiring about the 
reasons for preferring FARDC presence, people often invoked precisely 
its status as a state actor. As a woman from a village in Uvira territory 
explained: ‘If something happens, in case of the army we can go to the 
government, but in case of the rebels, there is nowhere we can go.’ 
Furthermore, the FARDC does not always compare negatively to civilian 
authorities, specifically since the legitimacy of the latter has sharply 
diminished due to what Vlassenroot has called a ‘general crisis of 
authority’ (2004, p. 56).  
 Other important elements of legitimacy concern people’s 
representations and expectations of authority as well as their beliefs about 
the (common) interests that power should support. These issues are part 
of Beetham’s (1991) second dimension of legitimacy, the justifiability of 
the rules of power in light of shared beliefs. In the context of the DRC, as 
in other hybrid orders, expectations of authority are influenced by the 
specific notions of reciprocity and representation that characterise Big 
Man ties. These do not only turn on the (re)distribution of spoils, but are 
also related to the demonstration of largesse (Chabal and Daloz 1999). In 
certain contexts, such expectations impact on the perceived legitimacy of 
FARDC commanders’ power. This especially applies to commanders’ 
home areas, or where they have been deployed for a long time and have 
built up a large network of clients. For example, the commander of the 
323rd Brigade headquartered in Kiomvu, in Mwenga territory, heavily 
sponsored the Kasmes football club in the capital town of Kamituga. This 
raised his popularity and standing, thereby facilitating the wide range of 
business activities in which he was involved.  
This example indicates that the relative legitimacy of the FARDC 
in the eyes of civilians is heavily shaped by beliefs and expectations 
concerning its tasks and performance. Of particular importance is the 
extent to which it provides needed public and private services. These 
services not only concern its role as regulator and private protector, but 
also its security duties. Logically, the expectations concerning what 
public and private goods the FARDC should provide differ between 
social groups. Not all civilians benefit from the private protection 
arrangements that the FARDC may establish with elites. Yet in certain 
cases, more private arrangements also generate public effects. For 
example, where the FARDC improves road safety as a result of a 
protection agreement with local traders, or in the framework of mutually 
beneficial commercial relations, wider layers of the population also 
benefit. These effects can be conceptualised as ‘positive externalities’, 
which derive from the status of some forms of protection as an indivisible 
good, from which it is difficult to exclude people (cf. Gambetta 1993, p. 
31). 
In general, the field data demonstrated that, for the majority of 
non-elite civilians, in particular the FARDC’s perceived performance in 
the domain of security has a very strong impact on the experienced 
legitimacy of its power position. This legitimacy also strongly influences 
perceptions of military revenue-generating practices. Especially where 
these are justified as contributing to the performance of the FARDC’s 
security duties, or where they enhance people’s own livelihoods 
opportunities, they can come to be seen as relatively licit. For example, 
roadblocks are less resented in areas where banditry abounds and where 
the FARDC is believed to reinforce security: ‘Better pay 500 Francs 
Congolais [FC] to the military than have all your belongings looted by 
the FDLR’, as a small scale trader stated at a roadblock in a forest in Fizi 
that is infamous for frequent ambushes. The importance of security for 
shaping perceptions of the legitimacy of the FARDC’s power position 
and revenue-generating practices is also illustrated by the impact on such 
perceptions of the levels and types of coercion used by the military. 
Logically, where the FARDC engages in violent forms of extraction 
generally evaluated as illicit, such as ambushing, robbery and looting, its 
overall legitimacy sharply diminishes.  
However, contrary to the ‘faced with a gun’ image depicted in the 
introduction, the vast majority of military economic practices do not 
involve direct (threats of) violence. Rather, intimidation is much more 
subtle, concerning mostly implicit or concealed threats that draw heavily 
on the imagination, anticipation and strategic calculations of the 
intimidated. The latter generally believe that ‘the military never forgets’ 
or that ‘once they meet this soldier on an isolated stretch of road, they 
will experience an “accident”’. Therefore, they bargain with caution or 
may refrain from contestation altogether. Another often-advanced belief 
can be characterised thus – ‘You never know, maybe you once end up in 
a situation where this soldier is the only one to help you’ – reflecting a 
desire to keep as many options open as possible. It therefore appears that 
civilians exercise a type of self-censorship in their dealings with the 
military, both as they try to manage the current situation and with an eye 
to the future. This makes it difficult to determine whether people comply 
out of fear, custom, expedience, strategic calculations or simply because 
they consider certain claims of the military to be legitimate. No matter 
what motives drive them, according to Beetham (1991), public acts of 
compliance ultimately contribute to making power legitimate. They 
possess both symbolic and normative force, as they have declaratory 
power and create mutual normative commitments. When studying the 
day-to-day routines of civilians in the Kivus and their everyday 
interactions with the military, it becomes clear that, in general, public 
compliance with the FARDC exceeds public contestation. This is not to 
say that the FARDC’s power is not openly contested, nor that such 
contestation is ineffectual. On the contrary, the military’s power 
ultimately has a negotiated character, as it is circumscribed by the power 
of others. The very complexity and fluidity of the Kivus’ social order, the 
multitude of stakeholders and registers and the transitory and fluctuating 
nature of power and alliances prohibit absolute domination and crushing 
oppression. This is a system that creates room for manoeuvre for both the 
dominant and the subordinated, as both can instrumentalise its disorder 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999). 
The negotiated nature of the FARDC’s power is indicated by the 
substantial variations in behaviour and revenue-generating practices that 
can be observed between specific military units in various deployment 
contexts. Analysing the wide range of factors that explain these 
differences, it was found that civilian practices of contestation are 
commonly of importance, although not always in a stand-alone fashion 
(Verweijen 2015). The small town of Kazimia, at the coast of the 
Tanganyika Lake in Fizi, presents a striking example at the micro level. 
At the time of visit, Kazimia had a relatively powerful and respected chef 
de poste (local administrator) as well as a proactive and locally well-
known human rights field monitor. These two actors had very little 
tolerance for arbitrary arrests by the military. Each time a case was 
reported, the human rights monitor would promptly depart to the FARDC 
headquarters to plead for liberation, with the chef de poste applying 
additional pressure. Furthermore, they regularly organised sensitisation 
sessions for the local population, warning them not to turn to the FARDC 
in case of disputes, but to submit these to the civilian authorities. As a 
consequence, the reported number of arbitrary arrests was substantially 
lower than in nearby Sebele, a roughly similar town controlled by the 
same battalion. When asked what could explain these differences, many 
informants pointed to the more assertive attitude of Kazimia’s civilian 
authorities and inhabitants. 
Despite the influence of practices of contestation, their cumulative 
effects on limiting military power appear to be weakened by, amongst 
other factors, civilians’ everyday routines of compliance and their 
propensity for instrumentalisation. These practices and attitudes are not 
only found among elites, but concern broad layers of the population. For 
example, a groundnut seller in Butembo proudly told that he never pays 
the 200 FC for charging his cellular telephone at a public booth, as he 
asks the soldier living next door to do it, and the military often refuses to 
pay for such services. Truck drivers said they condemned people who 
bought transport tickets half-price from soldiers who are granted free 
places on every ride, a practice generally regarded as fraudulent. Butchers 
at a market in Kanyabayonga resented the fact that customers buy cheaper 
meat from FARDC soldiers’ wives nearby, knowing that ‘it comes from 
the livestock stolen by their husbands’. Village elders in the Ruzizi Plain 
lamented that their children help the military with committing theft and 
robbery in a quest for fast and easy money. As most such acts are public, 
they constitute a show of compliance that ultimately contributes to 
legitimising the military’s power and practices. This, in turn, induces 
further consent, generating a self-reinforcing spiral of institutionalisation 
and legitimization. 
 
Conclusion 
The FARDC’s vast involvement in sometimes coercive forms of revenue-
generation in the Kivus produces, and is in part produced by, an insecure 
and militarised social order. Military economic practices are both the 
cause and the outcome of the military’s position of dominance within this 
order. In many contexts, this position has a certain degree of legitimacy, 
which influences and is influenced by evaluations of the FARDC’s 
revenue-generating practices. One foundation of this relative legitimacy is 
the military’s practices as a regulator, a private protector, a security actor 
and a business partner. In a context of weak civilian governance, a 
plurality of normative and authority frameworks and high levels of 
insecurity, these practices partly correspond to people’s beliefs about 
what public and private goods authorities should deliver and in what 
manner. One of the causes of this correspondence is that processes of 
militarisation have substantially altered these beliefs, casting violent 
practices and actors in a more favourable light. 
 These findings show some parallels to Roitman’s (2005) research 
on the connections between evaluations of economic practice and the 
intelligibility of power in the Chad Basin. Analysing how violent modes 
of appropriation have come to signify licit wealth, Roitman describes the 
emergence of new frameworks of regulatory authority, in which violent 
actors have gained prominence. These frameworks constitute what she 
calls ‘intelligible sites of power’, that provide forms of livelihoods, 
protection and social mobility to some (pp. 18–22). In a similar vein, this 
article has demonstrated that the FARDC’s power is generally 
experienced as intelligible, while some of its regulatory, protection and 
revenue-generating practices are evaluated as licit. Collaboration with and 
protection and regulation by the military are common-sense practices that 
have become embedded in the routines of everyday life. It has been 
argued herein that by engaging in such practices, Kivutiens end up 
(re)producing the structures of legitimation, domination and signification 
that underpin the FARDC’s power. This does not necessarily imply that 
they do so in a conscious or intentional manner; rather, the (re)production 
of structures of militarisation should be understood as the unintended 
consequences of an aggregate of individual practices. In this manner, 
individual common-sense acts produce collectively unfavourable 
outcomes (cf. Giddens 1984, p. 13). 
The importance of civilian–military interaction for understanding 
military revenue-generation, as demonstrated in this article, raises 
questions about mainstream policy solutions to this phenomenon. In 
particular, it casts doubts on the possibility of influencing the military’s 
economic practices by focusing only on the incentives of military actors. 
Policies inspired by such a vision emphasise improving salary payments 
and human rights training. However, by highlighting the importance of 
civilian–military interaction, this article suggests that the focus should 
also be on civilian practices and the incentives that shape these. The more 
holistic approach that would result from such a reorientation would fully 
recognise the importance of the interdependencies between the military 
and civilians. It would need to identify the conditions in which military 
units are motivated to develop less violent repertoires of revenue-
generation, while refraining from constant interventions in civilian 
affairs. Furthermore, it would need to examine the factors influencing the 
constraints and preferences that drive the military’s regulatory and private 
protection practices. This draws attention to tenuous property rights, legal 
pluralism and the absence of civilian governance structures which can 
provide effective dispute settlement, justice and economic regulation. 
Finally, it should take into consideration the importance of the discourses 
that legitimise violence and violent actors’ exercise of power. This points 
to the need to also, or especially, address the question: ‘Faced with 
militarism, what can you do?’ 
 
Note 
1. Fieldwork was predominantly conducted in the territories of Fizi, 
Uvira, Rutshuru, Beni and Lubero and had three units of analysis: 
individual military units; locales (partly selected on socio-economic 
features and security conditions); and finally, categories of economic 
operators, focusing on the transport, natural resources, agriculture and 
trade sectors. The main methods used were (participant) observation, 
semi-structured interviews and focus groups. For more details see 
Verweijen (2015). 
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